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Abstract
We study the effect of liberalization on costs and competition in the European
airline industry. We construct and estimate a model that includes demand, capacity,
and cost equations. The latter accounts for inefficiency and cost-reducing effort. We
show that failure to account for the choice of effort would lead to biased estimates
of efficiency and competition in the industry. We also find that the last European
Union package of deregulatory measures has led to significant efficiency improve-
ments and has fostered competition.
I. Introduction
We study the effect of liberalization on costs and competition in the Eu-
ropean airline industry, accounting for inefficiency and cost-reducing effort.
These are two ingredients that are usually excluded in empirical models of
competition since, in general, firms are assumed to be efficient and observed
costs to be exogenous. This is in contradiction to a long tradition of empirical
literature related to the measurement of efficiency through the estimation of
production and cost functions (see Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000).1 Moreover,
recent literature on incentives and informational asymmetries accounts for
the effect of cost-reducing actions of the firm, which sheds new light on
costs endogeneity. The new theory of regulation suggests that the producer’s
endogenous effort closely depends on the constraints exerted by the regu-
* Both authors are members of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. We would
like to thank Dennis W. Carlton, an anonymous referee, Lars-Hendrik Ro¨ller, Natalia Fabra,
Jordi Jaumandreu, and Carmine Ornaghi as well as seminar participants at Universidad Carlos
III and Universidad de Las Palmas for their comments. We would also like to thank Ana
Bazta´n, Elena Sanjurjo, and Laura Sanjurjo for superb research assistance. Funding from the
Fundacio´n Ramo´n Areces is greatfully acknowledged.
1 In particular, cost function specifications include an error term with two components in-
dependent of each other: a symmetric component that measures random variations of the frontier
across firms and captures the effects of measurement error, other statistical noise, and random
shocks outside the firm’s control and a one-sided component that captures the effect of global
inefficiency relative to the stochastic frontier.
230 the journal of law and economics
latory environment that it faces (Laffont 1994).2 Inefficiency and cost-re-
ducing effort are of particular importance when comparing industries subject
to different incentives or analyzing changes in firms’ behavior after a struc-
tural change in the rules governing the market. They can be expressed by
taking into account the regulatory constraints impinging on the activity of
each carrier. We are thus able to define a particular cost structure for each
type of regulatory regime. According to our results, failure to account for
the choice of effort would lead to biased estimates of efficiency and com-
petition,3 which suggests that a proper modeling of the incentives provided
by regulatory pressures allows a better evaluation of competitive forces.
The liberalization process of the European airline industry allows for a
suitable application of this framework. At the beginning of the 1980s, Eu-
ropean aviation was regulated by restrictive bilateral air service agreements
between the countries concerned. Most routes were served by a duopoly
operating under perfect collusion, and the industry was characterized by a
lack of incentives to improve efficiency. This situation allowed firms, in
many cases subsidized by their governments, to increase costs inefficiently.
Under the pressure of the U.S. Open Skies policy that started in 1978,
several changes took place in the European market. First, in 1984–86, several
governments started renegotiating their bilateral agreements to allow for entry
and price reductions in a few international routes.4 Second, the European
Community introduced three packages of measures in 1987, 1990, and 1992
that led to freedom to set frequencies, capacities, and prices and free entry
by European carriers in any international European route.5 This process of
gradual liberalization left the industry open to international competition,
which introduced a significant variation in firms’ incentives.
Simultaneously, European flag carriers got privatized, and explicit per-
mission by the European Union (EU) authorities started to be necessary in
order to receive any form of public subsidy. The new competitive pressure
became the strongest incentive for carriers to reduce costs and improve ef-
ficiency. In addition, during the second half of the 1990s, European carriers
2 Empirical works on this latter topic have not been numerous so far. See Dalen and Gomez-
Lobo (2003) and Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002a, 2002b) for an analysis of alternative regulatory
mechanisms applied to Norwegian and French urban transport networks.
3 Several authors have attempted to account for cost endogeneity problems in the airline
industry. Among them, Neven and Ro¨ller (1996) and Neven, Ro¨ller, and Zhang (2001) develop
a competition model in which firms face workers’ unions and market pressures that may affect
operating costs. They apply this model to the European airline industry for the regulated period
and show that the model that accounts for cost endogeneity supports a more competitive result
than the standard one. In addition, Ng and Seabright (2001) use a panel of European and
American carriers from 1982 to 1995 and a reduced-cost form in order to show that state
ownership substantially leads to higher operating costs.
4 Marı´n (1995) provides evidence for the effects of these liberal bilateral agreements on
route-level competition.
5 By April 1997, the same rules had to be applied to domestic routes within any EU country.
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organized themselves around code-sharing agreements and international al-
liances that emerged after long and complex processes of negotiation.
Using a nonnested procedure, we test several scenarios of incentive pres-
sures against each other in order to identify the one that fits the data best.
We show that cost-reducing effort has increased significantly only after the
introduction of the last EU package of deregulatory measures in 1992, since
the liberal bilateral agreements had limited effects and the 1987 package of
deregulatory measures had no effect on firms’ behavior.
The next section presents the cost, supply, and demand systems under
consideration in the model. Section III focuses on the construction of the
endogenous cost function, which depends on the state of the regulation.
Functional forms, the estimation procedure, and the empirical results asso-
ciated with the cost function are developed in Section IV. Section V is
dedicated to the evaluation of competitive forces in the industry, which entails
determining the pricing rules set by European carriers. Section VI concludes.
II. Determining the Ingredients of the Model
In what follows, we specify a model of airlines’ behavior that encompasses
situations of fully regulated as well as liberalized competitive markets. We
are concerned with the effect of liberalization on market competition and
firms’ efficiency and the interconnection between these two factors. Ac-
cordingly, in the context of our model, airlines decide simultaneously about
their cost-reducing effort and their pricing policy.
A modeling approach followed by several authors consists of assuming
that firms make individual decisions for each route they serve (for the Amer-
ican domestic market, see Borenstein 1989, among others; for the European
international market, see Marı´n 1995). This approach allows for route-specific
policies. The advantage of this is that it takes into account route characteristics
that may affect firms’ behavior, such as the number and identity of the
competitors, competitors’ prices, or the length and density of the route. Such
an approach would be useful for evaluating the effects of the different waves
of deregulation on European firms’ behavior in terms of costs reduction and
pricing. In particular, note that the first wave of deregulation, namely, the
liberal bilateral agreements, concerned some specific international routes
only, as explained in the introduction.
In this paper, we use data at the firm level (Ro¨ller and Sickles 2000; Neven
and Ro¨ller 1996; and Marı´n 1998, among others, use the same specification).
Note that route-level data for European carriers are scarce. In particular,
tickets prices at the route level are hardly available. This obliges us to use
aggregate data for firms’ cost and demand and consider that companies make
corporate decisions that affect their entire network. We therefore test whether
the different waves of European deregulation changed the decisions that firms
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make at the network level, but we do not try to identify which routes have
been significantly affected.6
Note, moreover, that airlines serve a large number of interconnected routes
that form a network. Sometimes consumers buy a company’s service in one
single route (what is known as a direct flight), but very often they buy sets
of (normally two or three) interconnected routes (indirect flights through one
or two hubs). In addition, when buying a ticket in an individual route, frequent
consumers take into account the company’s network size and characteristics
since this affects the flexibility to make further interconnections if needed,
exchange tickets, take alternative routes, and even enjoy frequent-flyer re-
wards and discounts. In other words, scope economies among routes and
network effects (almost) impose a common policy on all the routes served
by a given carrier. Our aim is to test whether the different waves of dereg-
ulation that affected the European market had a significant effect on the
global cost-reducing behavior of carriers. Whether the operator should find
appropriate and efficient solutions to solve potential conflicts, to improve the
training of its employees, or to reorganize its productive structure are de-
cisions that are worth considering at the network level.
Costs
In the short run, firms are endowed with a given technology that is de-
termined by the quantity and quality of capital installed, as well as a network,
determined by the history. In order to provide a given amount of service,
, a carrier must buy variable inputs, namely, labor, , and materials, ,Q L Mi i i
the productivity of which depends on installed capital, , and network ex-Ki
ogenous characteristics, . The production process and its underlying tech-zi
nology can be implemented through a short-run dual-cost function. Denoting
by and the price of labor and materials, the program of the firm canw wL M
be translated into the following terms:
min C p (w L w M) exp (v e),i L M
L,M
subject to Q p Q(L , M , K , z , t; r),i i i i i
where t is a trend and is a vector of parameters denoting technology.r
Note that are observed operating costs (which are different from efficientCi
operating costs) and v and e denote firms’ individual inefficiency and effort,
6 If deregulation affects only some international routes instead of the whole network of a
carrier, considering data at the carrier level may underevaluate the effects of deregulation on
the carrier’s behavior and lead to nonsignificant results. This is not the case in our paper since
we obtain strongly significant effects for any wave of deregulation that we consider.
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two parameters that are unobservable.7 Thus, it is assumed that inefficiency
prevents the firm from reaching the required output level at the minimumQi
cost. Cost-reducing effort can be undertaken by managers to counterbalance
the effect of inefficiency. For instance, managers may spend time and effort
in improving the location of inputs within the network, monitoring employ-
ees, solving potential conflicts, and so on. The associated short-run cost
function, conditional on capital installed, inefficiency, and effort is
C p C(Q , q , K , z , v , e ; b), (1)i i i i i i i
where is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Assume moreover thatb
cost-reducing effort involves some internal cost or disutility that can be
represented through a convex function . Cost-reducing effort is en-W(e ; m)i
dogenous and depends on the regulatory constraint impinging on the activity
of the airline carrier.
Capacity
Before moving on to the demand side, we should notice that in transpor-
tation industries, costs and revenues are driven by two different measures of
output. Costs are determined by capacity supplied, namely, available seat-
kilometers, which, in turn, depends on fleet capacity (measured by the number
of seats available) and total kilometers flown by the airplanes. However,
available seat-kilometers are only an intermediate output that is used by
consumers to produce the final output, revenue passenger-kilometers (see
Berechman 1993). This final output, , determines carriers’ revenues. Still,qi
capacity and demand are closely related by a function that may change with
time, t, and with the technology available,
Q p F(q , t; l), (2)i i
where is a vector of parameters.l
Demand
On the demand side, firm i’s demand depends on its own price and its
competitors’ price, and , respectively, as well as market-exogenous char-p pi j
acteristics, . A limited number of competitors meet on each route, withmi
the combination of competitors changing from one route to another. Different
competitors supply alternative products that differ in time schedule, number
of stops, availability of interconnections with other flights, and so on. Ac-
7 It might be useful to note at this stage that the inefficiency term v should be viewed as a
measure of relative inefficiency rather than absolute inefficiency. A measure of absolute in-
efficiency includes a component that can be explained by exogenous factors that may be
captured by various explanatory variables (for instance, the size of the network and the average
stage length defined in the following sections). Hence, the parameter v should be considered
the unobservable part of the absolute inefficiency, not captured by the explanatory variables.
234 the journal of law and economics
cordingly, the services offered by different airlines can be regarded as im-
perfect substitutes. Actually, a small set of competitors meet in each indi-
vidual market. By assuming the same cost-reducing effort and pricing policy
for all the routes served by one company, we are implicitly saying that pj
represents the average price requested by the different competitors that firm
i meets in the routes it serves. Accordingly, each carrier faces a demand of
the form
q (p , p , m , t; a), ip 1, . . . , N, (3)i i j i
where is a vector of parameters.a
Next, we need to define the structure of the system made of equations
(1)–(3). This entails describing carefully the decisions made by the airline
carriers, namely, cost-reducing effort and pricing. Before entering into the
analysis, it is worth a reminder that the pricing structure is independent of
the nature of the regulatory pressures impinging on the activity of the firm.8
For this reason, incentive effects and pricing by firms can be presented
separately. Although prices and effort are determined simultaneously in the
decision process, we choose such an approach for ease of exposition.
III. Regulatory Rules and Costs
This section focuses on the construction of the structural cost function.
During the second half of the 1980s, the European airline industry switched
from bilateral air service agreements to more competitive markets. This might
have influenced cost-reducing activities. We propose to account for these
regulatory pressures through the cost function (1) that is conditional on the
cost-reducing parameter . Deriving the equilibrium level of e and plugginge
it back into the primal cost expression allows us to account for endogenous
effort and derive a structural cost form that can be estimated. The aim of
such an approach is twofold. First, different scenarios associated with the
different waves of market deregulation can be tested against each other in
order to figure out what measures had significant effects on the behavior of
European airline carriers in terms of cost reduction. Second, accounting for
changes in regulation through the cost structure enables us to reduce the
source of mispecification, which, in turn, should avoid bias in the estimation
of the technological parameters. This will allow us to assess in a more
satisfactory way the effect of regulatory constraints on the degree of com-
petition of the industry.
Any firm that is a residual claimant for cost savings is willing to provide
effort e in order to reduce its operating costs, , in a significant manner.Ci
8 The particular structure we use to incorporate technical inefficiency and effort parameters
allows the incentive-pricing dichotomy principle to hold. See Laffont and Tirole (1993). It
means that the same pricing formula applies whether we assume strong or soft regulatory
pressures.
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Since the cost reduction activity is costly, the firm sets the optimal effort
level e that maximizes its profit . Denoting by the price of the servicep pi i
to be sold, the profit is simply defined as the difference between revenue
and total cost . The program of theR p q (7)p TCp C (e , 7)W(e , 7)i i i i i i
firm is
maxp p q (7)p  C (F(q (7), 7), q , K , z , v , e )W(e ). (4)i i i i i i i i i i i
e
Note that since revenue is independent of effort e, this program isRi
equivalent to the one in which the firm sets the optimal effort level e that
minimizes TC. The first-order condition of this program is
Ci ′ (F(q (7), 7), q , K , z , v , e )p W (e ), (5)i i i i i i i
ei
which implies that the optimal effort level equalizes marginal cost savings
and the marginal disutility of effort.
On the other hand, a firm that is not a residual claimant for cost reductions
has no incentives to provide costly effort. Therefore the optimal effort of a
nonresidual claimant firm is supposed to be equal to zero.
Before deregulation, European airline carriers were mainly public entities
regulated by bilateral service agreements. Subsidies would generally allow
these firms to completely cover costs. It is therefore assumed that before
deregulation, any operator would behave as a nonresidual claimant firm and
would not provide any effort at all. Denote by such an effort level. AfterRe
deregulation, as already mentioned, the new competitive pressure and the
abandonment of subsidizing practices would provide the operating firms with
perfect incentives for cost and inefficiency reduction. We consider then that
the optimal effort provided by a deregulated firm is given by the condition
(5) and is denoted as . Given these two effort levels, we can write the costDe
function as
s sC (F(q (7), 7), q , K , z , v , e ), (6)i i i i i
where s denotes the regulatory regime, which can be either regulation, R,
or deregulation, D.
IV. Testing the Effects of Liberalization on Costs
The next step consists in proposing specific functional forms for the cost
and demand functions, as well as the cost-reducing effort and the relationship
between demand and supply, in order to derive a set of structural equations
to be estimated. Using data on the European airline carriers before and after
the different waves of liberalization, we are capable of shedding light on the
cost structure that fits reality the best, namely, figuring out which package
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of deregulation had a significant effect on firms’ behavior.9 This section
presents the empirical model and the estimation results.
Empirical Implementation
We assume a Cobb-Douglas specification for the cost function in (1). This
specification retains the main properties desirable for a cost function and
provides a sufficiently precise description of the technology, while remaining
tractable for our purpose (for details on the same choice for the airline
industry, see Marı´n 1998). Alternative, more flexible, specifications such as
the translog function lead to cumbersome computations of the first-order
conditions when effort is unobserved.10 The cost function is then specified
as
b b b b1 2 3 4C p b q q Q K z exp (b t v  e  u ), (7)i 0 Li Mi i i i t i i ci
where , , , and denote wages, price of materials, capital installed,q q K zLi Mi i i
and network exogenous characteristics that affect the cost function and t is
a trend. In addition, represents effort, is the inefficiency term, and ise v ui i ci
an error term. Note that v is characterized by a density function definedf (v)
over an interval , where and denote the most efficient and[v , v ] v vL U L U
inefficient firms, respectively
For our empirical specification, we assume that includes measures ofzi
airlines’ network size, , and average stage length, (on the intro-NET ASLi i
duction of these two variables in the cost function and their effects on airlines’
productivity, see Marı´n 1998; Neven, Ro¨ller, and Zhang 2001)11 and has the
following shape:
b b5 6z p NET #ASL . (8)i i i
With respect to the internal cost of effort and the relationship between
demand, , and supply, , represented in (2), we assume the followingq Qi i
functional forms:12
W(e )p exp (me ) 1, m 1 0 (9)i i
and
l1Q p l q exp (l t u ), (10)i 0 i t Qi
respectively, where is an error term.uQi
9 See the Appendix for a detailed description of the data and the construction of the variables.
10 In particular, in order to solve for equation (13) below, plug it into equations (15) and
(17), and estimate equation (17) applying parametric techniques, we need a Cobb-Douglas
specification.
11 A measure of airport concentration was included in an alternative specification, but it
turned out to be highly correlated with the size of the network.
12 Notice that is a convex function, with , , and .′ ′′W(e ) W(0)p 0 W (e ) 1 0 W (e ) 1 0i i i
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The demand equation corresponding to (3) is specified in linear form as
follows:
q p a  a p  a p  a GCONS  a t u , (11)i 0 1 i 2 j 3 i t qi
where represents firm i’s weighted average price, which is calculated aspi
passenger revenues over passenger-kilometers flown, is consump-GCONSi
tion growth in its home country, as a measure of economic activity,13 ispj
an index of the passenger revenues over passenger-kilometers flown of all
other airlines, t is a time trend, and is an error term.uqi
Now, using the functional forms for operating cost (7), internal cost of
effort (9), and the first-order condition (5) on effort activity, we are able to
express the effort level under both regulation and deregulation periods. Note
that the first-order condition regarding optimal effort under deregulation
can now be written asDe
DC (7)p m exp (me ). (12)i i
Substituting (7) and (9) into (12), we can solve for asDe
1
De p (lnb  b ln Q  b lnq  b lnq  b ln Ki 0 1 i 2 Li 3 Mi 4 i
m 1
 b ln NET  b ln ASL  v lnm u ),
(13)
5 i 6 i ci
while
Re p 0. (14)i
As predicted by the new theory of regulation, the effort level of the residual
claimant firm increases with v; namely, a more inefficient carrier needs to
be more active in cost-reducing activities than a less inefficient one in order
to reach the same cost level. Note, moreover, that these carriers are willing
to provide lower effort levels when effort is more costly (the cost-reducing
technology parameter m is greater). Substituting and back into theD Re e
primal cost structure (7) allows us to obtain the final forms to be estimated:
and We therefore obtainR DC (7) C (7) .
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′D b b b b b b ′1 2 3 4 5 6C p c q q Q K NET ASL exp z(b t v  u ) (15)i 0 Li Mi i i i i t i ci
and
R b b b b b b1 2 3 4 5 6C p b q q Q K NET ASL exp (b t v  u ), (16)i 0 Li Mi i i i i t i ci
where , , ′zp m/(1 m) c p exp {lnb  [1/(1 m)](lnm lnb )} b p0 0 0 k
, and . Notice that as . In words, as the cost of′ ′zb u p zu b r b m r k ci ci k k
13 Some alternative measures of economic activity were included in this expression either
with or without GCONS. The inclusion of several variables led to multicolinearity problems.
When only one of the variables was included, none provided a better fit than GCONS. Ac-
cordingly, we decided to drop alternative variables and leave only GCONS.
238 the journal of law and economics
effort grows, the effort level falls and expression (15) converges to (16). This
implies that if effort is not taken into account, the estimates of the elasticities
will be biased.
The cost function to be estimated is then
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′D b b b b b b ′1 2 3 4 5 6C p y [c q q Q K NET ASL exp z(b t v  u )]i i 0 Li Mi i i i i t i ci
R b b b b b b1 2 3 4 5 6 y [b q q Q K NET ASL exp (b t v  u )],
(17)
i 0 Li Mi i i i i t i ci
where takes value of one if the firm operates in a deregulated industryDyi
and zero otherwise, while takes value of one if the firm operates in aRyi
regulated industry and zero otherwise. In the course of the estimation, several
vectors and will be assumed depending on the nature of the variousD Ry yi i
deregulatory measures introduced in the European airlines market, and their
results will be tested against each other in order to unravel their effects on
competition.
The system of equations formed by (10), (11), and (17) is determined
simultaneously. Accordingly, and in order to avoid endogeneity problems,
these equations are estimated by the instrumental variables estimation
method. The cost function (17) includes a nonobservable parameter, namely,
characterized by a half-normal density function 14 When estimatingv, f (v) .
this cost function, one needs to compute the integral of the joint density
function of v and over (for more details, see Kumbhakar and Lovellu [0, ]ci
2000). Note that the system is identified and all parameters can be recovered,
given that by homogeneity of degree 1 in input prices, .b  b p 11 2
Estimation Results
Tables 1–6 provide the results for the econometric model. We emphasize
in this section the two main arguments that are discussed in this paper. First,
depending on how deregulation is interpreted, different cost structures can
be estimated. Then a nonnested test helps us to choose the best cost structure
in the sense that it is the one that fits the data the best.
Table 1 presents the results for the demand equation. The coefficients of
all the variables are significant and have the expected sign. From our esti-
mates, own-price and cross-price demand elasticities of the average carrier
are and , respectively, which is in line with theh p 2.243 h p 2.114ii ij
14 The distribution of firms’ global inefficiency will be truncated from above if the most
inefficient firms exit the industry. However, given that global inefficiency is formed by two
components, namely, inefficiency beyond the control of the firm, v, and cost-reducing effort,
e, this does not lead necessarily to a truncated distribution of v; that is, a firm with a high v
could survive if it sets a high level of e, while a competitor with a lower v and a lower e
could exit. In addition, note that within the set of European carriers included in the study, we
do not observe any exit. First, this was not possible during the regulated period because public
subsidies ensured the balance of flag public carriers’ budgets. Second, we observe only the
first 7 years following liberalization before any firm decided to exit.
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TABLE 1
Demand Function: Instrumental Variables Estimation Method
(Dependent Variable: )qi
Variable Coefficient Estimate SD
Constant a0 .01 .01
pi a1 3.55 3.55
pj a2 4.52 4.52
GCONSi a3 .0005 .0005
T at .01 .01
Note.—SD of the error term p .12 (.01); p .76.2R
TABLE 2
Demand-Capacity Relationship: Instrumental Variables
Estimation Method (Dependent Variable: ln( ))Qi
Variable Coefficient Estimate SD
Constant l0 5.31 .78
ln( )qi l1 .68 .05
t lt .05 .01
Note.—SD of the error term p .45 (.03); p .67.2R
results reported in previous studies of the airline industry.15 Table 2 presents
the demand-capacity relationship. Again, the coefficients are significant and
have the expected sign. In both cases, the overall fit of the regression is
satisfactory. The main interest of these two equations is to provide instruments
for capacity and demand.
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimates for the cost function as well as the
effort disutility parameters, obtained from the estimation of equation (17).
(Vuong tests for alternative scenarios are presented in Table 5.) In order to
test the effect of liberalization, this equation is estimated under alternative
scenarios related to the deregulatory packages introduced by the EU and the
liberal bilateral agreements signed by the United Kingdom with other coun-
tries. In all cases but scenario 1, we include the term v to measure inefficiency.
In addition, the following distinctions are made: scenario 1 is a model with
no effort and no inefficiency term, in scenario 2 firms do not make any effort
to reduce inefficiency after the introduction of deregulatory measures—
namely, the effect of deregulation is not accounted for, in scenario 3 dereg-
ulation affects firms’ behavior after the third EU package of measures in
1992, and scenario 4 deregulation affects the behavior of the firms affected
15 A survey by Oum, Waters, and Yong (1992) on price elasticities of air transport demand
suggests that empirical findings obtained during the 1980s usually lie betwen .4 and 4.51.
A fairly elastic demand in the European airline industry should not be a surprise since our
database includes price-sensitive holiday markets.
240 the journal of law and economics
TABLE 3
Cost Function: Instrumental Variables Estimation Method
(Dependent Variable: ln( ))C*i
Variable Coefficient Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 3′′
Constant b0 1.095 (.724) .090 (.411) .049 (1.013) .292 (.747) .276 (.637)
wLi b1 .437 (.065) .393 (.037) .318 (.071) .375 (.076) .326 (.073)
Qi b3 .864 (.065) .933 (.063) 1.009 (.067) 1.028 (.060) 1.051 (.057)
NETi b5 .242 (.084) .228 (.088) .360 (.079) .368 (.078) .398 (.074)
ASLi b6 .400 (.088) .381 (.053) .422 (.097) .345 (.083) .405 (.101)
T bt .071 (.040) .068 (.032) .271 (.057) .097 (.040) .269 (.061)
ei ln( )m . . . . . . 3.754 (.214) 5.088 (.821) 3.969 (.256)
SD of v . . . .474 (.036) .270 (.077) .404 (.069) .313 (.054)
SD of error term .257 (.015) .023 (.026) .164 (.040) .098 (.057) .121 (.054)
2R .87
Vuong test 3.121 2.777 1.996
Note.—Standard deviations are in parentheses. Values for the Vuong test below 2 favor the alternative
scenario against scenario 3, and those above 2 favor scenario 3 against the alternative scenario. Scenarios:
(1) deregulation has no effect (eip0), and the model does not account for one-sided inefficiency (vip0),
(2) deregulation has no effect, (3) deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1992, (4) deregulation affects
firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways, KLM, Lufthansa, and after 1992 for the remaining companies,
and (3′′) same as scenario 3 but dropping the observations for the last 2 years (1998–99). Note that scenarios
3′′ and 3 cannot be tested against each other since they consider two samples of different sizes. In all
scenarios but 1 the model accounts for one-sided inefficiency term ( ).v ≥ 0i
by the introduction of liberal bilateral agreements, British Airways, KLM,
Lufthansa, and Sabena after 1985 and the remaining companies in 1993.16
The comparison of scenarios 3 and 4 allows us to identify whether the liberal
bilateral agreements have any effect on firms’ behavior.
In addition, in order to test whether the EU deregulatory measures started
having an effect in 1987, after the introduction of the first package of mea-
sures, we also try two alternative scenarios: scenario 3′, in which deregulation
affects firms’ behavior after the first EU package of measures in 1987, and
scenario 4′, in which deregulation affects the behavior of the firms affected
by the introduction of liberal bilateral agreements after 1985 and the re-
maining companies in 1987. Finally, given that some new competitors such
as easyJet and Virgin, not included in the sample, started operating a sig-
nificant number of international European routes during the period 1997–99
and that this could bias our measure of rivals’ prices, we construct scenario
3′′, which is recovered from scenario 3 after having excluded the last 2 years
of observations, 1998 and 1999.
The variable capital has been dropped from the regressions because the
correlation coefficient between output and capital is .91, which causes mul-
16 Scenario 4, with British Airways, KLM, and Lufthansa changing behavior after the in-
troduction of liberal bilateral agreements in 1985, has been chosen among different sensible
combinations of firms being affected by the agreements. The results on the other combinations
are presented in Table 4. Note that from the Vuong tests presented (Table 5), none of the liberal
bilateral agreement combinations seem to fit the data better.
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TABLE 4
Cost Function: Alternative Scenarios
Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7
Constant .036 (3.219) .281 (.725) .240 (.776)
wLi .389 (.142) .401 (.070) .374 (.076)
Qi 1.016 (.171) .983 (.075) 1.015 (.056)
ASLi .340 (.178) .340 (.089) .346 (.082)
NETi .381 (.109) .358 (.085) .354 (.075)
T .135 (.069) .124 (.049) .100 (.039)
ei 4.431 (.500) 4.550 (.454) 5.067 (.674)
SD of v .301 (.098) .316 (.085) .407 (.061)
SD of error term .170 (.054) .161 (.049) .093 (.050)
Note.—Standard deviation are in parentheses. Scenarios: (5) deregulation affects firms’ behavior after
1985 for British Airways and KLM and after 1992 for the remaining companies, (6) deregulation affects
firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways, Sabena, and KLM and after 1992 for the remaining com-
panies, and (7) deregulation affects firms’ behavior after 1985 for British Airways, KLM, Lufthansa, and
Sabena and after 1992 for the remaining companies. Alternative scenarios, namely, scenarios in which KLM
or British Airways were excluded from the group of carriers participating to the liberal bilateral agreements
from 1985, were also considered. Note that these scenarios could not be estimated because of convergence
problems with the parameter .m
ticollinearity problems.17 In addition, a maximum likelihood test indicates
that it is not possible to reject the model without capital against a model that
includes it at any sensible confidence level.18 Moreover, scenarios 3′ and 4′
cannot be estimated because of convergence problems with the coefficient
m.19 This indicates that the models are clearly misspecified, which suggests
that the deregulatory measures included in the first EU package had no effect
on firms’ behavior, probably because of their limited scope (consistent with
Ng and Seabright 2001).
For the remaining scenarios, the variables are significant and have the
expected sign. Costs are increasing with wages and production, while they
are decreasing with the size of the network and the average stage length.
The alternative scenarios are tested against each other with the application
of a test of nonnested hypothesis (see Vuong 1989). The test shows that
scenario 4 is rejected against scenario 3. This suggests that liberal bilateral
agreements had a limited effect on firms’ behavior, probably because they
affected only a reduced number of routes. In addition, the results for scenario
3′′ are consistent with those for scenario 3.
17 This correlation problem is common to most empirical studies dealing with the estimation
of short-run cost functions.
18 We also estimated a long-run cost function in which capital was regarded as a variable
input. Accordingly, a measure for the price of capital was computed from the companies’
accounting data and included in the cost function. This variable was not significant at any
confidence level.
19 This indicates that m and, accordingly, the internal cost of effort , tend to infinity. IfW(e)
this was the case, firms would not undertake any effort, and equations (15) and (16) would
be identical. In that case, a model with two separate periods would be clearly misspecified.
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TABLE 5
Vuong Tests for Table 4
Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7
Scenario 3 1.996 2.022 1.912 1.848
Scenario 4 . . . .136 .200 1.094
Scenario 5 . . . . . . .235 .045
Scenario 6 . . . . . . . . . .020
Note.—The Vuong tests are performed for line i against column j; that is, values for the Vuong test
below 2 favor the model in column j and above 2 favor the model in line i.
Scenarios 1 and 2 are rejected against scenario 3, which includes an in-
efficiency measure and assumes that deregulation affects firms’ behavior after
the introduction of the third EU package of deregulatory measures in 1992.
Given that scenario 1 represents the standard approach proposed by the
literature focusing on oligopolistic competition, its rejection supports the
construction of models including these components and indicates that we
have to be cautious when interpreting the results derived from other models.
For instance, the results for scenario 3 suggest that the European airline
industry is characterized by constant returns to scale, while scenarios 1 and
2 suggest the existence of increasing returns.20 In particular, rejection of
scenario 2 shows the importance of accounting for the effects of deregulation
on firms’ technology and inefficiency.
Taken together, the two periods of regulation and deregulation allow us
to identify the cost-reducing activity (namely, effort) in the model since a
different cost structure (a different technology) for each period is considered.21
Hence, the technology and the technical inefficiency can be estimated. Ac-
cordingly, a direct measure of the effect of deregulation on costs can be
quantified. From equation (6), a cost reduction ratio is given by Jp
. The cost reduction ratio for the av-D R R(C (7) C (7))/C (7)p exp (e) 1
erage firm over the period of deregulation is , which implies that,Jp .234
20 Note, however, that only for scenario 1 can the hypothesis of constant returns to scale be
rejected at the 5 percent level. This hypothesis for the airline industry is consistent with Caves,
Christensen, and Diewert (1982) and Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990), among others.
21 We could measure the cost reduction after deregulation by estimating two cost functions
(one pre- and one postderegulation) and comparing predicted costs. Our methodology, however,
improves upon this alternative approach for two reasons. First, we estimate the coefficients
describing the underlying technology with a larger sample. Note that, for instance, in order to
estimate , the alternative methodology would use information only for the period 1985–92,b3
while with our methodology, we use information from the period 1985–99, at the cost of adding
one more parameter. Second, the estimates of the underlying technology are needed to predict
costs for the period 1993–99. Provided with these predicted costs, we can measure the cost
reduction after deregulation. It is clear that including information on the period 1993–99 will
increase the quality of our estimates of cost reduction. In addition, in Section V, we need to
estimate marginal costs in order to evaluate competition. Marginal costs are defined as
. A biased measure of would lead to wrong conclusions about the evolution of price-b C /Q b3 i i 3
cost margins after market deregulation.
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on average, the liberalization of the European airline industry led to a 23.4
percent cost decrease.
One could also compare the results regarding inefficiency obtained for a
model with no effort, namely, scenario 2, with those obtained with scenario
3. We observe that inefficiency had been overestimated for all the companies.
The average firm’s inefficiency level is .215 under scenario 3 and .395 under
scenario 2. The two values are significantly different as measured by a t-test
( : ) whose statistic is equal to 5.067.H v  v p 00 (2) (3)
In a second step, a precise evaluation of the nature of competition in the
industry after deregulation can be obtained. We turn in the following section
to the competitive aspect of our study.
V. Evaluating Competition
Having now the most adequate cost estimates in hand, we are capable of
providing measures that characterize the degree of competition in the industry
after the introduction of liberalization in 1992.22 Our results are compared
with what would have been obtained if cost endogeneity had not been taken
into account.
We define the pricing program of each airline carrier. Again, we need to
distinguish the period of state regulation from the period of deregulation,
during which firms are set free to choose prices in order to maximize their
profit. Before deregulation, when firms are still state owned and regulated,
the maximization program presented in (19) is irrelevant. During this period,
prices result from bilateral agreements set by public authorities and are under
the control of the firms only partially. We could think about alternative
programs for this period, such as social welfare maximizing or monopoly
pricing. This would, however, go beyond the scope of the paper since our
intention is to focus on firms’ competitive practices after deregulation.
In a deregulated environment, provided with the cost and demand func-
tions, each firm solves the following program,
D Dmaxp p q (7)p  C (F(q (7), 7), q , K , z , v , e )W(e ), (18)i i i i i i i i i
pi
where is the optimal price to be chosen.pi
22 By estimating cost and demand functions, we are able to generate direct measures of the
price-cost margins. This approach follows the spirit of Genesove and Mullin (1998), who show
that direct estimations of the conduct parameter through the pricing rule may lead to significant
underestimation of market power. Similarly, imposing a specific conduct and estimating costs
may lead to over- or underestimation of costs when perfect competition or monopoly are
assumed, respectively. On the contrary, estimates are quite insensitive to the assumed demand
functional form.
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TABLE 6
Marginal Costs, Prices, and Margins
Scenario 1 Scenario 3
MC Pricea Mb MC Pricea Mb
All carriers .056 .107 .465 .065 .107 .376
LBA carriersc .044 .097 .560 .051 .097 .486
Non-LBA carriers .062 .111 .418 .072 .111 .320
Note.—All values for marginal costs and margins are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
LBA p liberal bilateral agreements..
a Observed values.
b M p price–marginal cost margin as expressed in equation (20).
c Includes British Airways, KLM, and Lufthansa.
Accordingly, the first-order conditions for firm i are given by
′ Dp  F (q (7))MC (F(q (7))) q 1i i i i i
p  , (19)
p p Di i i
where
DC Qi iD ′MC (7)p and F (q (7))p .i i
Q qi i
The term accounts for differences in price elasticities under differentD i
competitive situations. Using the estimates of the cost, capacity, and demand
system obtained in the previous section, our aim is to evaluate the price-cost
margins (expressed in the left-hand side of equation (19)) under the various
scenarios under consideration and test these margins against those that could
be obtained if carriers obeyed perfect Nash behavior, namely, when D pi
. Thus, we can figure out whether different conclusions can be reachedq /pi i
regarding carriers’ competitive behavior if different scenarios are accounted
for.
From the expressions of demand (11), capacity (10), and costs (17), the
price first-order condition (under Nash behavior) can be rewritten as
p  (l Q /q )MC (7) q 1i 1 i i i i
p  . (20)
p p ai i 1
Through the estimation of the cost function, marginal costs, , can beMCi
easily recovered. Putting them together with our estimate of the capacity-
demand elasticity , as well as the observed values for supply, demand, andl1
prices, we are able to evaluate the weighted price–marginal cost margin,
, set by each carrier, defined as the left-hand side of equation (20). TableMi
6 presents the values obtained under scenarios 1 and 3. Two interesting results
are worth emphasizing. First, considering the traditional approach with no
inefficiency and no effort, namely, scenario 1, would undervalue the average
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TABLE 7




Scenario 1 Scenario 3
Estimated t-Testa Estimated t-Testa
All carriers 1.213 .465 6.459 .376 7.180
LBA carriersb 2.077 .560 11.189 .486 11.822
Non-LBA carriers .781 .418 3.292 .320 4.114
Note.—LBA p liberal bilateral agreements.
a T-test for differences in either scenario 1 or 3 sample mean with Nash behavior sample mean.
b Includes British Airways, KLM, and Lufthansa.
marginal costs, MC, and overestimate the margin, M, of the industry. Hence,
the so-called traditional approach would undervalue the competition faced
by the European airline carriers. The margins obtained under scenarios 1 and
3 are significantly different, as shown by a t-test ( : )23 whoseT TH M M p 00 1 3
statistic is equal to 2.359. Second, the companies that pioneered the liber-
alization process and signed liberal bilateral agreements (LBAs) with other
EU countries and the United States obtain higher margins, even if these
companies face lower marginal costs and propose lower prices.
Using our estimates for the demand equation, note that, as suggested by
the right-hand side of equation (20), Nash behavior would entail an average
margin for all the carriers in the sample equal to 1.213. OurTMN
price–marginal cost margin values obtained under scenarios 1 and 3 both lie
below the Nash behavior margin . A t-test ( :T T TM H M M p 0, lp 1,N 0 L N
) presented in Table 7 shows that neither of the two scenarios entails pure3
Nash behavior, although scenario 3 supports a more competitive behavior.
It is also worth distinguishing carriers that pioneered the liberalization
process during the 1980s (LBA carriers) and those that switched to a com-
petitive market after 1992. Table 6 suggests that British Airways, KLM, and
Lufthansa were the operators setting the highest margins. This does not imply,
however, that these firms have a less competitive behavior. Note that from
the ratio evaluated at the average observation of the sample, it can beq /pi i
seen that the LBA companies meet demand on a more inelastic portion of
the curve than other companies.24 Hence, pure Nash behavior for LBA com-
panies entails a margin equal to 2.077, while for other companies, theLBAMN
margin is equal to .781. Table 7 shows that the values of these marginsOMN
under both scenarios 1 and 3 lie below the Nash behavior margins andLBAMN
. The values of the t-tests ( : and :O LBA LBA LBA O OM H M M p 0 H M N 0 L N 0 L
) suggest that neither of the two scenarios predicts NashOM p 0, lp 1, 3N
23 The term denotes the average price–marginal cost margin under scenario i when allTMi
the carriers of the database are considered.
24 The ratio is more than three times higher on average for the LBA carriers.q/p
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behavior for any set of companies. However, the other companies are closer
to Nash behavior than the LBA carriers, which suggests that the latter have
a more competitive behavior.
VI. Conclusions
The results obtained in this paper have proved fruitful on both method-
ological and institutional sides. First, it has been shown that a cost-supply-
demand structure that accounts for firms’ technical inefficiency and cost-
reducing activities fits the data better than the usual model proposed by the
literature focusing on oligopolistic competition. Moreover, our application of
this methodology to the airlines industry shows that the results obtained
under the standard oligopoly model would be seriously biased and could lead
to the wrong conclusions about efficiency and competition in the industry.
Second, it is suggested that the 1992 European deregulation package in-
troduced a significant change in the behavior of airline carriers regarding
efficiency improvement. We show that competition has increased significantly
only after the introduction of the last package of deregulatory measures in
1992, since the liberal bilateral agreements had very limited effects and the
1987 EU package of deregulatory measures had no effect on firms’ behavior.
We also show that estimated competition is tougher than if obtained from a
standard oligopoly model. This result is consistent with previous contributions
in the same industry that take into account cost endogeneity in different
manners.
APPENDIX
Data Description and Construction of the Variables
The data set has been constructed for the period 1985–99 from raw data included
in Digest of Statistics (International Civil Aviation Organization 1985–89), World
Air Transport Statistics (International Air Transport Association 1985–89), and Eco-
nomic Outlook (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1985–89).
The companies under study are the flag carriers from the largest European countries
affected by the European liberalization process, namely, Alitalia, Air France, Air
Portugal, British Airways, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, Sabena, and SAS.
The variables have been constructed as follows. In the cost function, costs ( ),Ci
production, ( ), wages ( ), capital ( ), and average stage length ( ) correspondQ q K ASLi Li i i
to total operating expenses (International Civil Aviation Organization 1985–89), seat-
kilometers available, flight crew salaries and expenses and maintenance and overhaul
expenses over number of employees, fleet total number of seats, and total aircraft
kilometers over total aircraft departures, respectively. With respect to total costs,
companies report one single figure that corresponds to passenger, freight, and mail
activities. The distribution of operations among these three activities can vary sig-
nificantly among companies. However, it is easy to obtain information on the total
number of tonne-kilometers flown that correspond to passengers (including baggage),
freight, and mail. We multiply total costs reported by each company by the share of
tonne-kilometers flown corresponding to passengers in order to compute our cost
variable. The data needed to construct these variables have been retrieved from
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various issues of Digest of Statistics (International Civil Aviation Organization
1985–89), apart from number of employees that are published by International Air
Transport Association. The term is constructed by the total number of routeNETi
kilometers over which an airline operates (International Air Transport Association
1985–89). Finally, the price of materials ( ) has been constructed as the averageqMi
fuel prices for the carrier’s home country and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (1985–89), weighted by the company’s domestic and
international operations, respectively (International Civil Aviation Organization
1985–89).
On the demand side, demand ( ) corresponds to passenger-kilometers flown, andqi
firm i’s weighted average price ( ) is measured as passenger revenues over passenger-pi
kilometers flown. Rivals’ price ( ) is the average value for passenger revenues overpj
passenger-kilometers of the remaining companies in the database. As carriers carry
different quantities of passengers over different networks, rivals’ prices are weighted
by the total seat-kilometers available that they fly, which is a measure of firm size.
Hence, rivals’ average price ( ) gives more emphasis to carriers with a higherpj
production, since these carriers meet firm i on an higher number of routes and
therefore exert a higher pressure on firm i’s activity. All the data on demand are
from International Civil Aviation Organization (1985–89). Consumption growth
( ) corresponds to domestic private consumption (Organisation for EconomicGCONSi
Co-operation and Development 1985–89). Finally, t the time trend, is equal to one
in 1985 and incremented by one each year.
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